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REGULATION OF CATV
Community antenna or cable television (CATV) originally brought
television to the rural fringe areas of the country, which were other-
wise out of range of network broadcasting. Today, city residents are
increasingly attracted to CATV because it improves their reception
and offers them many more channels. Subscribers pay about $5 per
month for the service plus a $10 to $20 cable installation fee. Unlike
network television, which is advertiser-supported, CATV must satisfy
the viewing appetite of its subscribers. Based on the phenomenal
growth rate of the CATV industry, which will serve an estimated 30
million viewers within the next ten years, it appears that this appetite
is growing and healthy.'
Every level of government has asserted some jurisdiction over the
operation of CATV systems, 2 but in Wonderland Ventures, Inc., v. City
of Sandusky3 the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck
down city ordinances franchising CATV in Sandusky and Fremont,
Ohio. The court held that the ordinances were invalid:
1) because they impose a gross receipts tax upon proceeds from
interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States, art. I, § 8, Clause 3 . . . and
2) because they do not contain definite standards for regulation
and administration. 4
Plaintiffs in the district court actions5 were Greater Fremont, Inc.,
and Greater Sandusky, Inc., both CATV companies which in 1966
1. Note, Who's Afraid of CATV?, 16 N.Y.L.F. 187 n.3 (1970).
2. The FCC has after years of non-involvement, stepped in and asserted its
jurisdiction over CATV but has only regulated two areas of the industry, distant
signal importation and operation in the top 100 U.S. markets. 47 C.F.R.
§§ 74.1103, 74.1107 (1971). In T.V. Pix, Inc., v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 D.
Nev. 1968), aft'd, 396 U.S. 556 (1970), the Supreme Court affirmed the District
Court of Nevada, holding that the FCC had not preempted the entire area of
CATV operation and that regulation and taxation of CATV by a state agency
was therefore permissible. Illinois, on the other hand, has by statute delegated the
power to license, franchise, and tax CATV to its municipalities. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (Supp. 1967).
3. 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
4. Id. at 551.
5. Greater Fremont, Inc., v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
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merged into Wonderland Ventures, Inc., a Michigan corporation
licensed to do business in Ohio. They sought to enjoin the enforce-
ment of city ordinances which regulated their business by way of a
franchise system. The planned CATV systems would have taken
television signals from Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and Ontario,
Canada, and transmitted them to subscribers in the two cities.
Through arrangements with Ohio Bell Telephone, both companies
were to utilize Bell facilities in distributing the cable transmissions
from the local "head-end" 6 facilities to the subscriber. Subsequent to
these arrangements, the cities passed the ordinances under attack.
The district court, after concluding that the FCC had not preempted
the particular area with which the ordinances dealt,7 found that the
cities lacked authority by statute or constitution to regulate these
CATV businesses. The court reasoned that since the ordinances were
premised on control of the use of city streets,8 the cities were without
power to regulate, because the increased use of Bell's existing facilities
imposed no further burden on the use of public streets. 9 The district
court further held that it could be a denial of equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment to allow regulation under the general
police power when similar modes of communication were not like-
wise regulated or subject to regulation.10 Enforcement of the ordi-
nances was enjoined.
The cities appealed the district court decision but, on grounds en-
tirely different than those used by the lower court, the court of appeals
found the ordinances invalid in their entirety and upheld the result
reached in the lower court. The court of appeals decision cited
Fischer's Blend Station, Inc., v. State Tax Commission, a 1935 case
dealing with a gross receipts tax on a radio broadcaster, as supporting
the holding that the tax here was a burden on interstate commerce.
In relying on Fischer's Blend the court overlooked the fact that the
direct burden concept applied in that case had been substantially
6. The term "head-end" refers to the equipment located in the vicinity of re-
broadcast which filters, translates, and otherwise modifies the signal received over
the air into the necessary form for transmission through the cable to the subscriber.
7. 302 F. Supp. at 660.
8. Id. at 656-57 n.4, 662-63.
9. Id. For other cases dealing with local power to regulate, see cases cited note
28 infra.
10. 302 F. Supp. at 662.
11. 297 U.S. 650 (1935).
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modified by subsequent commerce clause cases. 1 2 The present test of
validity of gross receipts taxes requires a separation of local from
interstate business and a tax only on the former, 3 and a showing by
the party opposing the gross receipts tax that there is in fact double
taxation of the same revenue. 14 The revenues received in Fischer's
Blend were derived from local and interstate advertisers, and the
benefits from the advertising were local and interstate in nature. That
ordinance made no effort to separate the local revenues from the
entire receipts. In comparison, the revenues contemplated in Wonder-
land Ventures were totally local. The subscribers paid a monthly
service charge and they all resided within Ohio.
The only interstate connection was that television transmissions
from other states were picked up by the CATV companies and re-
broadcast locally via the cable. In T. V. Pix, Inc., v. Taylor's the Su-
preme Court, in a memorandum affirmance of the Nevada District
Court, held that a state could regulate CATV and impose a gross re-
ceipts tax on CATV revenue. The fact that transmissions came
through interstate commerce posed no obstacle to the regulation or
the tax.16 In Pacific Broadcasting Corp. v. Riddell'7 the Ninth Circuit
upheld a Guam privilege tax on the gross receipts of a radio station
which were apportioned to the amount of advertising obtained in
Guam.
Since the Wonderland Ventures decision, the FCC has indicated
that it will continue a policy of allowing local regulation and taxation
of CATV.1S The FCC proposed policy rule states:
In line with this analysis and the general approach noted in para-
graph 6 [favoring federal minimum standards for local regulation],
it seems to us that the question of setting a maximum percentage
for local franchise fees is an area where we should set standards.
Such a proposed maximum fee is no more than 2 percent of a
12. Note, Gross Receipts Taxation of Interstate Mass Media, 55 IowA L. Rlv.
1268, 1273 (1970). See Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602(1951); Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Western Live Stock v. Bureau
of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
13. Note, Gross Receipts Taxation of Interstate Mass Media, 55 Iowa, L. REv.
1268, 1275 (1970).
14. Id.
15. 396 U.S. 556 (1970), aff'g 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968).
16. 304 F. Supp. at 463.
17. 427 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1970).
18. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,044 (1970).
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CATV system's gross revenues .... As to such CATV operations,
we note that with this plan, we are greatly facilitating the ex-
pansion of the system, with resultant greater revenues; thus, 2
percent of this expanded system is far more valuable to the city
an 7-9 percent of either no system or a much reduced one. We
stress again that the proposal is not designed to withdraw revenues
from franchising authorities but rather to strike a balance which
permits the achievement of Federal goals and at the same time
substantial revenues to the local entities.10
The earlier policy, while not dealing specifically with taxes, indicated
that "local entities, either at the State or municipal level depending
on State law, should-among other things-be concerned with various
licensing considerations pertinent to the public interest, judgment to
be made by the local authority . . . ."20 Although the taxes involved
in Wonderland Ventures were higher than the proposed maximum,21
the principle that local government has the authority, at least as a
matter of policy, to regulate and tax CATV is clear.22
As a second ground for invalidity, the court in Wonderland Ven-
tures relied on Interstate Circuit v. Dallas"3 to hold that the ordi-
nances lacked "definite standards for regulation and administration."'24
The Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit reviewed a city ordinance
that classified motion pictures and established a board to review the
movies to determine if they were suitable for young persons. If the
board found them objectionable, it required a rating which restricted
the audience to persons sixteen or over. The court struck down the
ordinance as violative of first amendment rights because it lacked
"narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for officials to
follow."2 5 The distinction between Interstate Circuit and Wonderland
Ventures is that the former sought to restrict expression itself, at least
as to a certain group, while the latter merely imposed financial bur-
19. Id. at 11,045.
20. Id. at 19,028, 19,031 (1968)
21. 423 F.2d at 550. The Sandusky ordinance imposed a 39 tax and the Fre-
mont ordinance imposed a requirement of bidding, which would easily have pushed
the percentage over 2% if more than one company were involved.
22. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,044 (1970) expressed the decision that the FCC had power
to regulate in the entire area of CATV, but for policy reasons would not exercise
this power. See also T.V. Fix, Inc., v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459, 463 (D. Nev.
1968).
23. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
24. 423 F.2d at 551.
25. 390 U.S. at 690.
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dens on the means of expression. The burdens in Wonderland Ven-
tures were totally unrelated to program content or any other aspect
of free speech as defined in the first amendment. The fact that the
various forms of the media are communicating does not give them
immunity from obligations to support governmental functions. They,
like other businesses, must assume this burden. However, taxes on the
activities protected by the first amendment have been scrutinized by
the courts to insure that the purpose of the tax is not to stifle or re-
strict the activity, especially when it is imposed on minority interests. 26
The franchise ordinances imposed in Wonderland Ventures do not
fall into the category of cases where first amendment rights are
abridged either by a tax or by more direct means. Rather it would
appear that a "deep pockets" theory motivated city officials to enact
these ordinances. In 1969 the CATV industry generated $800 million
in gross revenue.27 A small portion of this revenue would seem sub-
stantial to our currently "bankrupt" cities.
CATV is already a big business and is growing rapidly. Regulation
of the industry for the purpose of protecting network television in-
terests, promoting CATV development, or protecting consumer in-
terests is necessary. At present, the FCC has not totally occupied the
field and, as indicated earlier, has left a large part of the regulatory
process to state and local government, in spite of the decision in
Wonderland Ventures. There is currently a great deal of controversy
between city and state governments as to who has the power to regu-
late and tax CATV.28 With the additional obstacle imposed by the
court in Wonderland Ventures, regulation and taxation by state or
local government seems, at best, doubtful. For these reasons and the
26. This principle emerges in the context of cases dealing with unpopular re-
ligious groups where the tax burden was imposed on the preacher for delivering
his sermon, Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944); and where local
newspapers were opposing the city officials who had by "deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax [sought] to limit the circulation of information ......
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936), and Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117, 127 (1943). This issue is raised in a racial dis-
crimination context in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
27. 1969 BnoAn cAsTNo Yua"oorC 16, 20.
28. The district court in Wonderland Ventures relied primarily on lack of state
delegation of authority to regulate and also focused on the problem of cable being
strung on telephone company facilities which it additionally found to eliminate
the city's interest in regulation. City of New York v. Comtel, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d
585, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1968), also relied on this distinction of ownership
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fact that CATV could be a prime source of revenue for local govern-
ments, agreement with the result in Wonderland Ventures is unten-
able, much less supportable by any current precedent.
Thomas L. Story
of the distribution system in striking down a local ordinance in similar factual
circumstances.
Other recent cases deal with traditional arguments involving municipal authority
to act, public utility vs. private business and related problems. See, e.g., Connecti-
cut Television, Inc., v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 159 Conn. 317, 269 A.2d 276
(1970); Clear Vision CATV Services, Inc., v. Mayor of Jesup, 225 Ga. 757, 171
S.E.2d 505 (1969); Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. City of Decatur, 96 Il. App. 2d
454, 238 N.E.2d 261 (1968); CATV Wichita, Inc., v. City of Wichita, 205 Kan.
537, 417 P.2d 360 (1970); KAOK-CATV, Inc., v. Louisiana Cable T.V., Inc.,
195 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1967); City of Waterville v. Bartell Telephone T.V.
Systems, 233 A.2d 711 (Me. 1967); Staminski v. Romeo, 62 Misc. 2d 1051, 310
N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1970); DiBella v. Village of Ontario, 4 Ohio Misc. 120,
212 N.E.2d 679 (Ct. C.P. 1965); Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518,
238 A.2d 758 (1968); Aberdeen Cable T.V. Service, Inc., v. City of Aberdeen,
S.D. -, 176 N.W.2d 738 (1970); Rutland Cable T.V., Inc., v. City
of Rutland, 122 Vt. 162, 166 A.2d 191 (1960).
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